changes in southern politics in a massive, body of literature.M arked Democratic gains in tbe western Middle West and in nortbern New England during these same years, however, bave attracted far less attention from botb journalistic and academic observers of American politics. Iowa is one midwestern state wbose Democratic party bas recorded some of tbe most striking gains registered by a former minority party since 1950.
Analysis of aggregate voting and demograpbic data, as well as of newspaper accounts of Iowa politics, indicates tbat Republican gubernatorial factionalism contributed more tban any otber factor to the increased Democratic gubernatorial vote of 1952, 1954, and 1956 , tbe first and most important development in tbe early years of tbe Iowa Democratic revival. Republican gubernatorial factionalism explains 1950s Democratic gubernatorial gains better tban do eitber urbanization-industrialization or Democratic party revitalization, tbe two factors most frequently cited in earlier attempts to account for tbe increased Democratic sbare of tbe Iowa vote. Altbough urbanization and industrialization preceded and accompanied the increasing Democratic vote for governor, analysis of demographic and of voting data reveals tbat tbe party's sbare of tbe vote increased no more rapidly in urban tban in rural areas. After 1952, the Democratic percentage of the Iowa vote for both governor and president increased most sharply in rural areas buffeted by the falling farm prices which characterized the years of the first Eisenhower administration. The role of Republican gubernatorial factionalism in contributing to the increased Democratic vote of the early and mid-1950s is also apparent in the much larger gains posted by Democratic candidates for governor than by the party's nominees for other offices. Republican gubernatorial weakness, rather than across-the-board Democratic strength, explains the shift in the 1950 to 1956 gubernatorial voting behavior of Iowans.
introduction to the burgeoning literature on political change in the South see, among oftiers. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequences Since 1945 (New York; Basic Books, 1976) ; Monroe Lee Billington, The Political South in the Twentieth Century (New York: Scribners, 1975) ; and William C. Havard, ed.. The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Kou^e: Louisiana State, 1972) .
In viewing the Iowa political landscape of the last forty years, 1956 stands out as the pivotal year. In 1956, Iowans elected a Democratic governor for the first time in twenty years. They also elected a Democrat to the United States House of Representatives for the first time since 1940. Unlike the Democratic gains of 1932, which were massive, depression-based, and temporary, the 1956 achievements were limited, do not appear to have been related to such national phenomena as the business cycle, or to international developments, and have continued to grow, albeit irregularly, in the quarter century following that election.
As Table 1 indicates, the election of a Democratic governor in 1956 resulted neither from a sharp increase in the Democratic percentage of the gubernatorial vote between 1954 and 1956, nor from a steady increase in the Democratic share of the vote over a period of several elections. In electoral terms, two factors produced a 1956 Democratic gubernatorial triumph. One was a modest increase (2.9 percentage points) in the Democratic percentage of gubernatorial vote between 1954 and 1956; the other was a sharp increase (7.3 percentage points) in the Democratic gubernatorial vote four years earlier.T hus the origins of the state's Democratic revival are in the 1952 election, the first bid for the state's highest office by Herschel Loveless, the successful Democratic gubernatorial candidate in 1956. In the first Loveless election, despite the landslide victory registered by the remainder of the Republican ticket in Iowa, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, William S. Beardsley, won re-election with less than 52.0 percent of the vote, the first Republican gubernatorial candidate in sixteen years to fall below that figure. Beardsley not not only ran 7.2 percentage points behind his own 1950 share of the vote, but ' Unless indicated otherwise, changes in a candidate's (or a party's) vote from election to election, or the variation between votes received by a party's candidates for different offices in the same election, refer to increases or decreases in the candidate's (party's) share of the vote, rather than to changes in the number of votes received. The 2.9 percentage point increase in the Democratic gubernatorial vote between 1954 and 1956 indicates that the party's share of the vote for that office increased from 48.3 percent in 1954 to 51.2 percent in 1956.
Whenever the quantitative data cited in the text are taken from the tables included in the paper, no further citations to the sources oí those data will be given. he divergent paths of the Republican presidential and gubernatorial votes in 1952 resulted from a third feature of the election, a marked increase in split-ticket voting. The minimum figure was 11.9 percent, the difference between the Eisenhower and the Beardsley percentages of the vote. This was more than double the average amount of ticket splitting in the six presidential elections preceding 1952.*'
A substantial increase in the number of votes cast, and in the percentage of eligible voters who went to the polls, also disUowa Official Register, 1931 Register, -1932 1933 -1934 1935 -1936 , pp. 314-315. 'Official Register, 1921 -1922 2925 -1926 1929 -1930 1933 -1934 , pp. 248-249. "Official Register, 1929 -1930 1933 -1934 tinguished the 1952 presidential election. As "Official Register. 1921 -1922 1923 -1924 1925 -1926 1927 -1928 I929-I930, pp. 426-427; 1931 -1932 1933 -1934 1935 -1936 , pp. 316-317. "Official Register, 1955 -1956 ALTHOUGH most journalists and academicians have largely ignored recent Democratic gains in the western Middle West and northern New England, a few observers have described and attempted to explain these developments. An Iowa City native described and analyzed the state's Democratic revival in his 1977 Harvard senior honors thesis, a journal article, and a book.'^ Iowa journalists also usually attempt to explain the election results they describe. ''OfficialRegister. 1886. pp. 90-91; 1888, p. 139; 1890, p. 190; 1892, p. 233; 1894, p. 186; 1896, p. 222; 1898, p. 227; 1900. p. 314; 1902. p. 368; 1904, p. 347; 1907 -1908 1909 -1910 1911 -1912 1913 -1914 1915 -1916 1917 -1918 1919 -1920 "Chiefly because the Republican party was badly divided on the question of temperance legislation, Boies, a former Republican, captured the governorship in 1889 and again in 1891. These were the first Democratic gubernatorial victories since Stephen Hempstead's in 1849 and 1851, and the last until Clyde Herring's in 1932 and 1934 . Official Register. 1977 -1978 "James C. Larew, "A Party Rebom: The Democrats in Iowa, 1950 Iowa, -1974 Previous interpretations of the early stages of the Iowa Democratic renaissance are chiefly of two types-those wbicb emphasize long-term developments and those wbicb focus on more immediate events. Among the long-term developments wbicb are alleged to have contributed to tbe Democratic revival in Iowa are the urbanization and the industrialization of tbe state. According to this interpretation, as increasing proportions of Iowans moved to urban areas and accepted non-agricultural employment after World War II, substantial numbers of them modified their political values and priorities regarding such questions as labor unions, unemployment insurance, taxation, legislative apportionment, social services, and such aspects of personal conduct as the use of alcoholic beverages. According to those who emphasize these basic changes in tbe structure of society and in Iowans' perceptions of a desirable social and political order, the Democratic party responded to changing conditions and to new demands by the voters more readily than the Republican party; thereby it gained the support of increasing numbers of Iowa voters, particularly those in urban areas. Although many of tbese developments culminated during the governorship of Harold Hughes, in tbe 1960s, writers who emphasize changes in the state's economy and demography locate many of these developments in the seventeen years preceding Hughes's first election as governor. ^Â second interpretation emphasizes the reorganization, the revitalization and the modernization of the Democratic party in Iowa. According to this view, the Democratic party would achieve equality witb its chief rival only if it shed its traditional image, both as a loser and as a dispenser of patronage, and become a highly organized, issue-oriented, and urban-based political mechanism. Proponents of this view regard the dis- In the early years of the Iowa Democratic revival, urbanindustrial counties recorded slightly smaller, not larger. Democratic percentage gains than more rural counties. Because of their larger populations, urban counties may have contributed more votes to the increased Democratic tally than rural counties, but there is no evidence that the Democratic percentage of the vote increased more rapidly in urban counties in the first seven years of the 1950s.
Interpretations of recent Iowa Democratic gains which emphasize the role of a reorganized and revitalized Democratic party organization concentrate on the period after 1958, the year in which Jake More's critics succeeded in ousting him from the chairmanship, with particular emphasis on the six years following the election of 1960, when Lex Hawkins headed the Iowa Democratic party. Because of the time element, it is difficult to assess the impact of party organization work on the Iowa Democratic vote during the period covered by the present study. Despite this difficulty, however, the prominent role of men like Lex Hawkins, Wade Clarke, Neal Smith, and Robert Johnston in the Polk County Democratic party, in the decade before they captured control of the state organization, provides an opportunity to assess the impact of their organizational work on voting behavior during the early years of the Iowa Democratic revival. This can be done by comparing Democratic achievements in Polk County with those in the rest of the state during the years when Hawkins and others perfected their methods in the state's largest county. If improved organizational techniques contributed as much to the Iowa Democratic revival as the admirers of the new methods contend, the accomplishments of the Polk County Democratic organization should have surpassed those of other county units during the decade preceding More's defeat.
A comparison of developments in Polk County with those in the rest of the state during these years offers little, if any, support for interpretations which attribute much of the Democratic renaissance to a revitalized party organization. Among the more transient factors cited as explanations of the early years of the Iowa Democratic revival are specific political issues and personalities. Interpretations of this type are most commonly offered in explaining the results of particular elections, e.g., the narrow Republican gubernatorial victory in 1952, or the election of a Democratic governor four years later. In the first six years of the 1950s, the substantive issues included proposals to permit the union shop, others to reapportion the legislature, and some to legalize the sale of liquor by the drink. Thesales tax, particularly after the legislature increased it from 2 to 2V2 percent in 1955, also attracted much attention.'" those Republicans who criticized Beardsley when he announced for a tbird term, others, including his opponents in the 1952 Republican primary, faulted him for his well publicized personal income-tax problems, and for allegedly attempting to sell diseased livestock."
Considerable numbers of Republicans also attacked Beardsley's successor, Leo A. Hoegh, whom Beardsley bad appointed as attorney general, and who was widely regarded as Beardsley's choice in tbe six-candidate contest for the 1954 Republican gubernatorial nomination. Hoegh's convictions and actions combined to irritate many Republicans. These included conservative Republicans in general, and the members of tbe Iowa Manufacturers' Association in particular, both of whom resented Hoegh's support for legislation wbicb would permit tbe union shop in Iowa, and his efforts to establish closer contacts between tbe Republican party and organized labor. ^° Some criticized Hoegh for using the attorney general's office to curb tbe sale of liquor by the drink, wbich was then illegal, while others resented his announced opposition to proposals for tbe legalization of liquor by tbe drink, and for bis definition of this as a moral issue. Hoegb's aggressive governorship, in which he resorted to publicizing tbe voting records of Republican legislators whom he accused of failing to support tbe party platform, is also alleged to bave alienated many Republicans.^Ĥ is record regarding taxation is widely believed to have contributed to Hoegh's defeat in his 1956 bid for re-election. Perhaps tbe most publicized action was the governor's acceptance of a 1955 bill increasing the sales tax from 2 percent to IVz percent, even though be opposed the measure, and in 1956 campaigned for a return to the lower rate. According to Hoegb's supporters, bis creation of an Iowa Tax Study Commission, which he hoped would contribute to efforts to make the state's tax system more fair, instead persuaded many that be sought tô 'Register: 22 May 1952. p. 1; 25 May 1952, p. 2-L; 28 May 1952, p. 1; 29 May 1952, p. 1; 1 June 1952, p. 2-L; 2 November 1952, p. 3-L; 5 November 1952 , p. 11. "Regisfer: 1 October 1954 14 October 1954, p. 1; 18 October 1954, p. 1; 1 November 1956 , p. 9. Register, 21 October 1956 increase taxes. By 1956, Herschel Loveless and the Democratic party fastened on Hoegh's record in the field of taxation, as they campaigned against "High Tax Hoegh." Also alleged to have weakened tbe governor for his bid for re-election were his many travels, in Iowa and outside the state, as well as his butch baircut and bis small mustacbe." By their very nature it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate many of these explanations of Democratic gains and Republican losses in contests for the governorship in the elections of 1952, 1954, and 1956 . At least one of the explanations, however, can be tested by the use of aggregate voting data. Although Republican and Democratic candidates for governor during these years differed consistently and clearly in tbeir announced positions on the question of the legalization of tbe sale of liquor by the drink, and large numbers of Iowans on eacb side of the issue appeared to regard it as a matter of considerable importance, its impact upon voting behavior appears to bave been negligible, as Table 3 indicates. Altbough counties where dry sentiments were strongest increased tbeir Democratic gubernatorial vote slightly less than other counties between 1950 and 1952, they recorded slightly larger Democratic increases tban otber counties four years later, as well as for the entire six-year period beginning with tbe election of 1950. Tbe size of all of tbe correlations suggests that, despite the considerable amount of interest in the issue, it was not sufficient to modify traditional voting babits. Tbere is no evidence tbat the increased support among Iowans for tbe legalization of liquor by tbe drink, as reported by the Des Moines Register's Iowa Poll, explains their increased approval of Democratic gubernatorial candidates during these years."
Altbough urban counties registered larger Democratic gubernatorial percentage increases than rural counties from 1950 to 1952, the latter posted the largest Democratic gains between 1954 and 1956, thereby enabling the traditional minority party to capture tbe governorship for the first time in twenty years.
" Register: 18 October 1956, p. 3; 23 October 1956, p. 4; 1 November 1956, p. 9; 8 November 1956 , pp. 9, 10. "Sunday Register: 15 June 1952 28 March 1954, p. 7-L; 24 February 1957, p. 12-G. Discontent with Hoegb contributed significantly to the voting behavior of Iowa Republicans wbo abandoned tbe incunnbent in his bid for a second term. Another factor, bowever, was crucial in the creation of a Democratic gubernatorial majority in 1956. This was tbe growing discontent of Iowa farmers witb tbe level of farm prices and witb the agricultural policies of tbe Eisenbower administration. Altbougb all but two Iowa counties gave Adlai Stevenson a larger percentage of their vote in 1956 tban in 1952, rural counties posted tbe largest Democratic percentage increases, as Table 3 indicates. Two of the most urban counties in tbe state, Dubuque and Linn, recorded the only decreases in the Democratic percentage of tbe presidential vote between 1952 and 1956. Tbis statewide reduction in tbe Republican vote at tbe head of tbe ticket, combined witb the high rate of ticket splitting, enabled Iowa Democrats to capture the governorsbip which had eluded tbem during most of the state's history.
Most observers contend that a large turnout benefits Democratic candidates; however the record of the Beardsley-Loveless years offers little support for that conclusion. Despite the coincidence of the increase in the Democratic gubernatorial vote with the increase in the total vote in 1952, analysis of the two developments indicates that, at least in Iowa, Eisenhower was the chief beneficiary of the large increase in turnout.^* While it is difficult to estimate the proportion of new voters who cast ballots for Loveless, it appears clear that the largest contributions to his close race in 1952, as well as to his election four years later, were the continued high level of support by Democrats and a substantial increase in the Democratic gubernatorial vote among Republicans.
Although the relatively larger voter turnout of the last thirty years may have contributed to some of the Democratic gains of this period, its impact on the Democratic gubernatorial
•A further indication that a large vote did not necessarily benefit Democratic candidates is available in the 1950 gubernatorial election. In that contest, 39.7 percent more Iowans voted for governor than in the preceding off-year election. Despite the sharp increase in voter turnout, the Democratic share of the vote for govemor decreased from 42. Republican weakness is the best explanation of Democratic gubernatorial gains in the 1950s. Beardsley's income tax and other troubles created serious divisions within the Republican party in 1952, resulting in a bitter primary battle and in widespread Republican defection in the general election. As Beardsley's chosen successor, Hoegh inherited his predecessor's problems, and added to them with his liberal views and his style of political operation. Had Beardsley retired voluntarily after two terms, or bad he lost his 1952 primary bid, it is probable that the party's gubernatorial nominee would have ridden the Eisenhower coattails, as well as the sizeable Republican majority among Iowa voters, to an easy victory in 1952. Without the Republican near-defeat that year, and the divisiveness resulting from it, it is highly unlikely that Iowa Democrats would have posed much of a threat to continued Republican domination of the governor's office in subsequent 1950s or early 1960s elections. Eisenhower's continued popularity in the state in 1956, as well as Nixon's in 1960, suggests that Iowa Democrats would not have captured the governorship any earlier than the 1964 Barry Goldwater debacle. Had Iowa entered that election witb a Republican governor, it is highly improbable that the party's problems at the presidential level would have produced Democratic gains of the magnitude recorded in 1964. Without Harold Hughes as a popular incumbent in 1964, it is inconceivable that Iowa Democrats could have recorded the sweeping victories they achieved when they had both Hughes and Goldwater to aid them in registering a Democratic landslide that year.
Gubernatorial factionalism within the state's Republican party contributed more than any other factor to the electoral accomplishments-both victories and near-victories-of the gubernatorial wing of the Iowa Democratic party, 1952 to 1966. The election and the subsequent administrations of Democratic governors Loveless and Hughes then persuaded significant numbers of Iowa voters to cast their ballots for Democratic candidates for other offices, thereby contributing to an increased Democratic vote at all levels in the longtime Republican stronghold.
